HAIT Journal of Science and Engineering B
Volume 2, Issues 1-2, pp. 7-30
© 2005 Holon Academic Institute of Technology

 

Environmental quality and satisficing games

Charles S. Tapiero

Bar Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel and
ESSEC Business School, 1 Av. Bernard Hirsch, 95021 Cergy-Pontoise, Cedex, France
e-mail: otapiero@yahoo.com
Received 27 July 2004, accepted 28 October 2004

 

This paper outlines selected facets of environmental quality and strategic risks and control. In particular, an environmental games approach is emphasized and a ``satisficing'' solution is suggested. Such a concept is motivated by the complexity of environmental games, the partial information available and by a claim that in such circumstances, the traditional Nash equilibrium might not be appropriate. A specific application - an environmental game, is used to demonstrate the approach we follow and draw some conclusions regarding the process of investment in technologies for policy abatement and environmental controls.


 


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