HAIT Journal of Science and Engineering B Volume 2, Issues 1-2, pp. 7-30 © 2005 Holon Academic Institute of Technology | |||||
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Environmental quality and satisficing games
Charles S. Tapiero
Bar Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel and | ESSEC Business School, 1 Av. Bernard Hirsch, 95021 Cergy-Pontoise, Cedex, France e-mail: otapiero@yahoo.com Received 27 July 2004, accepted 28 October 2004
| This paper outlines selected facets of environmental quality and strategic risks and control. In particular, an environmental games approach is emphasized and a ``satisficing'' solution is suggested. Such a concept is motivated by the complexity of environmental games, the partial information available and by a claim that in such circumstances, the traditional Nash equilibrium might not be appropriate. A specific application - an environmental game, is used to demonstrate the approach we follow and draw some conclusions regarding the process of investment in technologies for policy abatement and environmental controls.
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